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Monitoring Mechanisms of the Social Safety Net Programmes in the COMCEC Region

Selected Case Studies, Lessons Learned and recommendations

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Phase 2 findings

Evidence from Indonesia, Pakistan, Uganda, Mozambique and Ethiopia

Sample selection

	Highly developed monitoring system, in use	Highly developed monitoring system, work in process	Adequate monitoring system	Basic monitoring system
Arab region			Tunisia (NPTP) – <i>Upper Middle Income</i>	
Asia	The Islamic Republic of Pakistan (CDCP) – <i>Lower Middle Income</i>			The Republic of Indonesia (RASKIN) – <i>Lower Middle Income</i>
Africa	The Republic of Uganda (SAGE) – <i>Low Income</i>	Mozambique (PSSB) – <i>Low Income</i>		

Indonesia

Raskin Programme: introduced as an emergency food security programme in 1998 under the name of OPK and renamed Raskin in 2002

- Over 50 percent of government expenditure for social assistance
- Delivers between 15 and 20 kilograms of rice monthly at a subsidized price

Supply:

- **Indicators:** Raskin's Guidelines indicate that there are six indicators to judge the programme's effectiveness: correct targeting, amount, price, time, quality, and administration (vague!)
- **Data Sources:** No MIS, some 'visits' arranged, no community monitoring
- **Institutional arrangements:** unclear, formality for staff

Demand:

- Low focus on M&E at national level, decentralised context, long-running programme, M&E activities generally considered as only compliance tasks and are often assigned to lower-level employees, little or no budget for monitoring, no incentives

Outcomes

- Monitoring does not contribute to any outcome
- Existing feedback not taken up to improve implementation

Pakistan

CDCP Programme: Citizen's Damage Compensation Programme - nationwide temporary SSN put in place by the government of Pakistan following severe floods in late July 2010 – one of the world's largest emergency SSNs.

Supply:

- **Indicators:** results based monitoring framework, defining key indicators at all levels (input to outcome)
- **Data Sources:** Main source is programme MIS, but also visits, 'mystery customer' approach, bank's payment database, household survey for beneficiary satisfaction
- **Institutional arrangements:** clearly defined in operational manuals

Demand:

- Support from World Bank and externally driven, but consultations with all stakeholders; high levels of capacity (good recruitment and training)

Outcomes

- Monitoring has extensively helped to improve programme implementation and design (female staff, timing of information campaigns, etc), as well as accountability – but no focus on budget or providing public info
- Registration run by NADRA allowed for high-technology solutions such as WATAN cards and electronic payments and of the biometric identification card

Uganda

SAGE Programme: an unconditional cash transfer that targets labour-constrained individuals and households

Supply:

- **Indicators:** a) a very high level of tailoring and flexibility to programme needs; b) a detailed plan outlining how each indicator is assembled in practice; c) a strong link to the programme MIS.
- **Data sources:** range is varied and well-triangulated, including MIS, Beneficiary Assessment reports, Service provider data, Internal reviews & other administrative data, national household survey and Census, Pay-point monitoring form/exit survey
- **Institutional arrangements:** clearly spelt out in the programme manual and Performance Data Management Plan

Demand:

- Pilot, so national policy framework is very favourable for M&E; internally and externally driven process; good training and capacity but sometimes no budget.

Outcomes

- Monitoring has extensively helped to improve programme implementation (e.g. complaints handling) and design (e.g. targeting senior citizens through CBT) as well as accountability (e.g. campaign webpage), including meeting with CSOs etc

Tunisia

PNAFN Programme: National Assistance Programme for Needy Families - monetary aid and health insurance

Supply:

- **Indicators:** new framework being developed, but old system with few basic indicators in place
- **Data sources:** new Single Registry being developed, previously only reports that were often not collected and compiled, field visits and national survey data
- **Institutional arrangements:** Project Implementation Unit (PIU) set up under auspices of the Ministry of Finance in 2012 will carry out M&E functions

Demand:

- national commitment to improving the effectiveness of SSNs, but also strong push from World Bank; role of Arab Spring; reformed system requires administrative capacity, which to date has been problematic especially at the local level

Outcomes

- Slow progress, few results to date

Mozambique

PSSB Programme: one of the oldest non-contributory transfers in Africa and the largest in Mozambique: the Food Subsidy Programme (PSA), now called the Basic Social Subsidy Program. Currently being reformed.

Supply:

- **Indicators:** are clearly linked to the main components of the Programme, mapped back to its data source and aimed at detecting constraints or delays in implementation – based on extensive consultations with staff
- **Data sources:** MIS, national survey, community surveys - triangulated
- **Institutional arrangements:** INAS is independent agency with delegations nationwide; MoUs with other ‘partners’

Demand:

- both UNICEF and World Bank have been involved; expanded coverage and budget, stronger focus on training and capacity building

Outcomes

- None to date, but importance of slowly building consensus around which information should be monitored and why – diagnosing information gaps and coordinating potential partners



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Overall recommendations

Supply: indicators

- **Improve results frameworks.** In some cases indicators are badly defined because project objectives are not clearly thought through in the first place.
- **Improve design of indicators.** These should be:
 - developed through a consultative process that incorporates all levels of SSN management;
 - have a strong focus on how data will actually be collected and used;
 - be clearly mapped back to their data sources (including how each piece of data will be collected in practice and then aggregated and used);
 - not be over-ambitious;
 - follow the CREAM criteria;
 - be clearly linked to the programme's objectives and theory of change, and its administrative structure.

Supply: indicators

	Performance indicator	Definition	Unit of measure	Data source	Method of data collection	Frequency of data collection	Responsible for data collection	Data use
	1.0 Household Registration/ Coverage							
1.1	No of HHs registered by UBOS/URSB disaggregated by district and sub-county	A count of HHs registered during HH registration exercise	Number	HH registration exercise report	Report review	Monthly	SAGE Operations Manager	Management
1.2	No of individuals registered by UBOS/URSB who have been issued with birth certificates	A count of individuals registered by UBOS/URSB who have been issued with birth certificates	Number	HH registration exercise report	Report review	Monthly	SAGE Operations Manager	Management
1.3	Number of sub counties covered by UBOS/URSB registration							
1.4	No of beneficiaries receiving SCG disaggregated by sub county	A count of beneficiaries receiving SCG		SAGE MIS	Report review	Monthl	SAGE Operations Manager	Management

Supply: data sources

- **Improving access to and triangulation between different data sources.**

Under-utilised data sources include:

- National Surveys – especially if adding questions on SSNs specifically;
 - ad-hoc qualitative studies – cheaply answers why and how;
 - beneficiary feedback surveys and scorecard methods – the satisfaction of citizens within the communities where programmes operate is the ultimate indication of good programme functioning (and beneficiaries are often the ones who know programme malfunctioning best).
 - other admin databases linked through a unique ID – civil registration as side target
- Where possible, **improve use of Programme MIS.**
 - making sure the logical design of the information system is developed by those in charge of the programme rather than delegated to IT experts;
 - making sure data used for monitoring purposes is simply generated as a by-product of the administration process itself;
 - differentiating reports depending on target audience;
 - ensuring flexibility in the query and reporting functions of the MIS.

1.



In other words? Wasting less time and money collecting new data and **focusing on potential of existing sources!**

2.



Supply: institutional arrangements

- **Improving institutional arrangements for implementation of monitoring activities.** Standardise and formalise processes and responsibilities (of data collection, data analysis and reporting, and data interpretation). Options include:
 - legal frameworks defining roles and responsibilities of different actors;
 - strong and detailed programme manuals used in conjunction with capacity building and training;
 - creation of programme Steering Committees;
 - Memorandums of Understanding between different agencies/ministries etc.

Generating demand...

- **Linking in to the wider policy framework.** One strategy for example, is to get buy-in from key decision makers and stakeholders with decisional power: the Ministry of Finance, Planning Commissions and Parliament. Eg. Uganda
- **Increasing the implementing agency's capacity and political freedom and releasing budget constraints.** For example through the creation of a separate agency responsible for delivery of SSNs, with budget autonomy compared to the relevant line Ministries
- **Focus and clarify the objectives of the monitoring system.**
- **Invest on individuals' capacity and commitment** through training and strong incentives.
 - Capacity building and training should be a continuous exercise that evolves as the SSN evolves;
 - The practical importance of monitoring information for tailoring of programme implementation and design should be continuously stressed through practical examples;
 - M&E officers should be involved in all strategic programme meetings and have daily interactions with programme managers;

Generating demand...

Carrots	Sticks	Sermons
<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Awards or prizes—high-level recognition of good or best practice- Budgetary incentives for high-performance- Provision of budget-related incentives to ministries/agencies to improve performance (for example, finance ministry provides greater funding certainty through a medium-term expenditure framework,- Greater management autonomy provided to programmes performing well.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Enact laws, decrees, or regulations mandating M&E.- Have formal requirements for the planning, conduct, and reporting of M&E- Withhold part of funding from ministries/agencies that fail to conduct M&E.- Achieve greater transparency about government and managers' performance by regularly publishing information on all programmes' objectives, outputs, and service quality. Performance comparisons across jurisdictions (states,	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- High-level statements of endorsement by president, ministers, heads of ministries, deputies, and so forth.- Frequent repetition of message of support at meetings of ministry senior executives, section heads, other staff.- Awareness-raising seminars/workshops to demystify M&E, provide comfort about its doability, explain what's in it for participants.- Use of actual examples of influential M&E to demonstrate its utility and cost-effectiveness.

And more simply...

Defining and designing monitoring for what it sets out to do, in our case, in very simple words:


Help to create the best possible safety net for the poor

Monitoring in itself has no inherent value.

“The value of Monitoring (...) does not come simply from conducting monitoring (...) or from having such information available”, but from “using the information to help improve government performance” (Mackay, 2007)

After all, etymology is from Latin verb *monere*:

“to warn, admonish, remind”



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Thank you